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Unlike many Kurdish and Nestorian villagers, as well as the people of Rowanduz itself, the Jerahig all belong to one or another "tribe" (Kurdish, 'ashiret, from Arabic, 'ashira), a matter which also demands clarification. The typical Kurdish tribe contains several elements of a different character. Membership usually depends upon descent, but individual families or much larger groups can keep their tribal allegiance, and either join another group, or form an individual tribe of their own. While some of the larger confederations appear to be of considerable antiquity, the smaller groups come and go with the vicissitudes of war, wealth, and leadership. Nor are the tribes made up exclusively of nomads, for, while the nomad may play a dominant role in furnishing pugnacious leadership and armed men, the wealth and numerical strength of such a group come largely from its villagers. Because many of the chieftains are landowners, persons living in villages owned by them, whether Muslim Kurds or Nestorian Christians, are said to "belong" to the chieftain's tribe. Nestorians often dress in the typical garb of their "tribe," taking part in many of its common affairs, although there is almost no possibility of intermarriage between them and their Muslim fellows. While there seems to be little historical evidence to support or refute such a view, the Kurdish tribe appears to represent an intermediate stage between groups whose membership was actually based on descent and those whose character is purely feudal, a situation which may have

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perform in its formal administration in the area. It would be ungrateful to speculate on the character or strength of strategic installations throughout the district, as these constitute an important link in the chain of defenses which guard the northern frontier of Iraq. It is possible, however, to make some cogent general remarks concerning the unit which has its training headquarters near Rowandiz, and whose commandant, a colonel, has prestige and power equivalent to that of the pirmmam. On the southeastern bank of the Rowandiz river, between Rowandiz and Zindian, is located the garrison, quartered in a huge rectangular barracks enclosing an interior parade ground, constructed some years ago by the British. This building houses barracks, stores, offices, mess-rooms, and, with a few exceptions, everything necessary to the operation of the unit. Near it other parade and training grounds have been set up. Slightly closer to Rowandiz, below the road by the river, is a motley aggregate of small mud-brick dwellings which are used as married quarters for the non-commissioned officers. Most of the officers as are accompanied by their wives have their homes in Rowandiz.

The unit includes a large number of officers and enlisted men, and the ethnic origins of both groups are somewhat varied. The colonel was a Muslim Kurd, a major was a Nestorian Christian, one captain was a "Turcoman,"[3] and

[3] "Turcoman" in English usage; referred to as Ta'rabeg, they prefer the term Turkmen, "Turkmen," themselves.

another one of a Muslim Turkish family. Enlisted personnel include a large number of conscripts assigned there for training, many of them "Kurds Arabs." Uniforms and equipment, like organization, are derived from the British army, and the army has, of course, a greater variety of modern arms, as well as equipment, than the police. It might be thought that the district would gain from the supply of such a unit, but most of the rations are brought in by lorry from the quartermaster depot in Erbil. The details of training need not concern us. It is a common sight, however, to see a company of infantry struggling up a mountain-side in manoeuvres, and in the summer the valleys may resound with artillery practice.

Officers, when off duty, have free pass to Rowandus, and it is from this fact that they exercise an important social influence in the town. Enlisted personnel, excepting those few non-commissioned officers who have known there, are not permitted in Rowandus save during the daylight hours of Friday. It is some testimony to their desire for diversion that so many make the long climb to the town on Friday, simply to sit in a chaikhana where they can drink tea, talk, and play at backgammon (tawli in colloquial Iraqi Arabic). Military police patrol the streets of Rowandus, not only on this day, but throughout the week. However, enlisted men have much fewer excuses to Rowandus, the small collection of houses and a mosque, which marks the site of old Rowandus beneath the bluff, and there is a

every village maintains its own little flock and its shepherd. In addition, individual households make a practice of buying animals to fatten for slaughter, for example, for the feast that ends Ramadan, and they wander freely in the yards and streets, usually given into the care of a youngster. Poultry and eggs are of similar dietary importance to the villager, and chickens, ducks, geese, and turkeys are kept in large numbers. Mountain partridges, the shiny symbol of chore, are often penned in small cages for fattening. Poultry are usually left to forage for themselves, and almost every household has a number of chickens pecking for nourishment in its yard. One street in Rwanda, to the fearful epithelia of dogs and hyenaeers, was entirely dominated by a huge rooster.

For drawing the plough oxen are commonly used. Donkeys and mules are occupied with the transportation of burdens, sometimes far out of proportion to the size and apparent capacity of the animal. Only the Rwandan Christians seem to push horses, unlike the Kurd or Arab. It is interesting that muleteers, like their counterparts in Europe and America, often carry on extended monologues with their beasts, quite oblivious to the amusement of listeners. One such speech, addressed to a donkey by a young driver and transcribed at the time was, in part, as follows: "Go along, uncle (*khali*), go along. Why are you so slow today? Why are you no longer a friend to me? Khaki! watch out! You surely looks like that sheep. Come along, uncle, you will have an allied one day." Horses, mules, and donkeys

the district is derived from agriculture and animal husbandry, and that the surplus production so obtained is marketed directly to Erbil or through a number of local centers, of which Rowanduz has major importance. As a channel of trade, however, between Erbil and the producers, the town must also depend to a certain extent on a profitable commerce with the villagers, either through its money or its illegitimate treasure. Here, too, volume has fallen, and two reasons can be cited, the first of which is the rise of Dyana. This village, the struggling mercantile competitor of Rowanduz, arose on lands owned by Lali Khas near a British rest-camp constructed during the second World War and now abandoned. Dyana is now sought out, at the expense of Rowanduz, for a very cogent reason. It is customary for a villager to have a continuous debt, usually five or ten dinars, with a merchant, paid off again and again and just as often reconstructed. Many villagers now go to Dyana by reason of such a sum owed in Rowanduz, not because they wish to escape payment, but to obtain a desired respite and expansion of credit. Dyana is also center of access from the new main road than Rowanduz, and this may contribute to its popularity. Whether or not the villagers will sooner or later exhaust their credit in Dyana and return to their old market is difficult to say. However, in Ottoman times there were thirty or forty Jewish households in Rowanduz and they continued in those numbers until the coming of the Israeli War in Palestine. They were skilled craftsmen and their departure for Israel,

although the Israeli is universally despised, brought a
smile in the variety and quality of craftsmanship in
Rawandiz freely confessed and regretted by the townspeople.
A man who now wishes to purchase such things as gold
jewelry for his wife must travel to Erbil.

It must be admitted that the strength of the town
as a center based on village trade is precarious, and much
of the commercial activity with importance in district
economy has been replaced by service to the government
personnel and the several wealthy landowners who reside
within it. In brief, the economic realignments of the
first World War have changed the bases of the size and
importance of Rawandiz. Once these were primarily com-
mercial, and only secondarily political, while today a
reversal of this position has taken place. The increased
influence of the government, which is a matter of concern,
into everyday life has introduced into the town a new
income without whose supplement Rawandiz might have ex-
perienced certain decline.

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suffered. Of the non-Muslim, the Jews might be mentioned first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli war, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have already migrated to their new country. The departure of the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who come from the Western world, and those who are native to the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. The military prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are recognised, and almost any male from these countries is *ipso facto* an *effendi* or gentleman. The Briton, because of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldeans, Greeks, and Easterians, who have been Islamic subjects in the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce, and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians in the cities, as cheats but thieves. The Chaldeans and the Easterians, most of the latter displaced from their homeland in Turkey after the First World War, were once exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful folk, were not considered particularly different from Muslim peasants. Turkish chieftains and their men have been invited to Easterian festivals and there has been

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considerable social intercourse between the two groups. Unfortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq, took service with the British, particularly in the infantry levy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in crushing the Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled in the Kawandoz area, at Ainkawa, Dere Harir and Qasre, and, while outwardly amicable, the Nestorians feel toward them a certain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance with the British, especially in the lucrative occupations of the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, the Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as are able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native group are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of their daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them. One may find Muslims in England with American, British, or German wives, but never armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. Native girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim woman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent danger of being slain by their relatives, and the English press is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of them assume Christian names, often of a classic favorite, and wear a cross conspicuously at the throat, changing outwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam commands tremendous respect from its followers and is a "proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A Muslim may be swayed by a worthwhile to a certain point,

Iraq the Sunna is represented by most of the Arab groups, the Kurds, the Turks, and the Turkomans. The conflict between the two, often with violent political expressions, is not the same as that between Catholic and Protestant in Germany, although there is little analogy in the type of religious contact. The governing class in Iraq, dating from Ottoman times, is almost half Sunnite, and the discussion is often phrased along ethnic lines, Arab and Turk against Arab and Persian. Certain practices, such as circling the beard with henna, are condemned by the Kurds alternatively as Shiite or Iranian. Curiously, they ascribe alliteration, in the Shiite host purely Arabic and implicit, as Persian, "Persian," despite the fact that the Persians seem to have no record in that country. One might suppose, particularly in view of the growth of pan-Islamic movements in recent years, that this distinction between Sunnite and Shiite was falling into decay. As a criterion in determining the investigation, on being informed by an army officer that he came from the southern provinces, humorously inquired if he belonged to the Shi'ah. When the officer replied seriously in the affirmative, there was a burst of laughter and derision from his fellow officers and officials, a setting of an ironic embarrassment. Here on the highest levels of society, there are few marriages between Sunnite and Shiite families.

The third division is on ethnic or national lines, which, aside from foreigners and non-Muslims, separates

Arab, Kurds, Turkomans, and Turks. There are Persian 5638
minorities in the cities of central and southern Iraq, but they fall under the religious classification of Shi'ah and there seems to be no conflict between them and Arabs of their own persuasion. The Turks are few in number and are concentrated in the middle and upper classes. In the days before the liberation of Iraq, there was bitter enmity toward the Turks as the representatives of Ottoman rule, but this has disappeared in recent years and there is no restriction, as, indeed, there never was, on marriage between members of this class and Sunnite Muslims, Arabs and Kurds, of comparable status. A survey of the lists of officials and army officers reveals the remarkable extent to which the survivors of Ottoman rule have retained their position in the government service. The Turkomans are centered in central and northeastern Iraq, mainly about Alton Kaupri and Kal Kaajaq, and have been unrepresented in national affairs, largely farmers and shepherds, a remnant of the famous Kurds of the White Sheep. Again, there appears to be no restriction on marriage with Sunnite Muslims, but there is little reason for an Arab, Kurd, or Turk of the upper classes to take an illiterate, impoverished bride from among them.

The matter of Arab and Kurd is quite otherwise, for in the case of the latter there is a well-armed minority population, Muslim, and hence free of the susceptibilities of religious attack, with a strong base in agriculture and tribal leadership. They are estimated at 400,000 persons,

In treating the class made up of officials and officers, certain things from the initial discussion in this section may be seen. The first of these are the religious and ethnic divisions. Failing to mind the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, a number of Christians are to be found in the official class in Rwanda, for example, the postmaster and several of the teachers. Because of their religion, these men are at once disadvantaged among their colleagues. At a gathering to which one or more Christians have been invited, they may be embarrassed whenever religious matters are discussed and are generally limited in the forcefulness of their words, for they are unable to argue with the fluency of expression permissible between fellow Muslims. A Christian teacher cannot castigate his pupils with the freedom of some other, often to his chagrin, for the students are aware of his social inferiority. Similarly, an occurrence of the distinction between Hamite and Bantu in this class has been noticed. Of greater importance, however, is the division along national lines between the government class and the two other groups to be found in the town. Both the landed aristocracy and the townspeople are ethnically homogeneous, while the official class is diverse in its members, made up of Arabs, Hausa, and Turks, with the first group providing the greatest numbers. The Turks are little troubled, but a Kurdish civil servant must be circumspect in his conduct and exercise some care that he does not exhibit what might be interpreted as revolutionary sentiments or

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behavior. The ethnic barrier between the Arab officials and the local inhabitants is by far the most striking. Divisions along lines of locale or tribe have little or no significance for members of the official class, although many of them, especially the Arabs, may belong to the latter type of group, in addition to their local origin. There is a certain amount of banter between natives of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, or other cities, just as in America much is heard of the rivalry of various cities and states, but it does not operate in any serious way to divide the group. The furor connected with tribal affiliations in Iraq appears to be only appropriate in its proper setting, and a pair of officials, members of two tribes engaged in a deadly feud in some rural area, seem to make nothing of it divorced from the actual scene.

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Something of the relations of the official class to the aristocracy and the townspeople has already been indicated. While a number of the Kurds may regard the government in a poor light, it would be a mistake to assume that they do not have admiration or fondness for certain of the officials. Conversely, it would be equally erroneous to think that many of the officials do not have a paternal affection for their charges. Nevertheless, the whole theory of personal relations between officials and townspeople is based on the thesis that "familiarity breeds contempt," which has a certain amount of validity. An over-friendly mutir might be looked upon with more suspicion and distrust than one who was comfortably distant. Thus the more

with each other in Arabic, heavily interlard their speech with English and French words and phrases. The official class can, with legitimacy, claim that it is the more progressive and better educated, but, as if to drive a wedge between itself and its subjects, the adjective baladi, "rustic," is used with fluency and condemnation. As this new "civil elite" continues to assert itself at the expense of its parallel, the landed chieftains, both Kurd and Arab, Westernization has become one of its distinctive marks.

Thus thrown back on themselves for these reasons, the distinctions between Arab and Kurd, and between educated and uneducated, and their insistance on "distance," the officials and officers have of necessity created a social life of their own, exclusively masculine. A private house in the upper part of the town, whose garden overlooks the gorge, was subsidized as a nadi or "club." This building is of a single storey, built on three sides about a flagged courtyard which forms the garden, and encloses only several rooms. Its previous occupant had been an educated effendi whose hobbies were the occult sciences, and he decorated the walls with snakes and other symbols in paint which might lead the uninformed observer to erroneous conclusions in the realm of popular religion. One of the rooms was furnished with chairs and benches, much as a diwakhana, another had a table and chairs for cards, and a third was utilized as a kitchen. Two of the townsmen were hired as servants. In the club one might purchase tea, sherbet, and,

sometimes, alcoholic beverages, and light refreshments, such as nuts, bread, and grilled meat. Activity begins at four or five in the afternoon, and, should a card party be in session, can remain open into the early hours of the morning. The rooms and garden are illuminated with lanterns, and at times an official or officer will loan a battery-operated radio for entertainment. Aside from gambling, however, the principle diversion is conversation, the men seating themselves in little groups according to their preferences. The conversationalists usually depart for their homes between nine and ten o'clock in the evening, one of the servants often accompanying them through the darkened streets with a lantern. Although not nominally members, persons of the aristocratic Kurdish class occasionally appear in the club, sitting by themselves or with some official of their acquaintance. It has been related how Sayyid Ahmad and Karim Agha were visitors in the course of an evening, but such appearances are by no means common, nor do the aristocrats indulge in gambling. As has been said, the officials and officers, unless they are Kurds, do not visit the houses of chieftains. No women is ever seen in the club.

Aside from the month of Ramadan, during which most assume the appearance of piety, the chief entertainments of the higher officials and officers are drinking and gambling. The drinking-party has been described in a previous section, and is usually associated with a game of cards.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY

In treating the families of Kawandus, it is unnecessary to describe in detail those of the official class, for the officials and officers are of diverse ethnic origins, Arab, Kurd, and Turk, and they are often unmarried or unaccompanied by their wives. Even when settled temporarily in the town with a spouse, they represent only in part the larger social units to which they belong elsewhere in Iraq. None of the officials and officers has yet made Kawandus a permanent residence. It is thus possible, making reference to the officials whenever necessary, to direct attention to the Kurdish populace, aristocrats and commoners. It has been chosen to treat the family of a wealthy merchant as typical, and to draw comparisons with others from this central treatment.

It is important at the outset to define what is understood by the Kurdish "family." For the townspeople, the term most regularly used is mal, "house," (perhaps from Arabic, mal, "property"). The word is alternately used for the physical structure itself or for the group of kindred to be found in such a dwelling. Postmarital residence is normally patrilocal, the groom taking his bride to his father's house or to a new dwelling furnished

gradual increase of their holdings, have reached a position of dominance over their neighbours. In Kurdish feudalism the chieftain "owns" the lands of his tenants and levies a yearly tax. The terminology of feudalism, however, is that of the tribe, and, as has been noticed, a Nestorian Christian tenant may be spoken of as "belonging" to this or that chieftain's tribe and wear its traditional garb. The two systems, the tribal which is primitive in character and the feudal which is based on individual ownership of land but which is also pseudo-primitive, are interwined in the Rowandiz district. There are men who are the leaders of tribes, others who are feudal landlords, and still others who are both. The aristocracy is undifferentiated in terms of the tribal or feudal systems, using the same titles, and is based on noble descent. The relationship between the chieftain and the tribesman or tenant is always in personal terms. Just as in the case of the tribe, the feudal landlord is expected to direct the life of his tenants and to arrange them. The commoners identify their honor with that of their chieftains and are glad to give up a share of their produce, for they partake of the prestige of their superiors. Although there is no structural deterrent, the mixture of tribal and feudal systems in Kurdish Iraq is normally decentralized, segmented into hundreds of groups whose relations with one another are not always amicable. Lastly, with the exception of the Nestorian Christians, the chieftains and commoners belong to the same ethnic unit and are qualitatively undifferentiated

with respect to culture. Feudalism, while it may not be "primitive," is here mixed with a primitive, tribal system and uses its terminology.

In civilized society, in contrast to primitive, membership is not held to be based on descent but on residence and property relations, and this form of society is represented by the state. This does not mean that the state does not use the primitive terminology, for, out of numerous examples, one might remember the insistence of the National Socialist government of Germany prior to the second World War on "blood" and "race." Of greater importance, the state has a different system of economy, because, depending on its constitution, it defines its resources as its own, as the personal property of its citizens, or both. The state in this sense is not a newcomer to Iraq, inasmuch as some of the earliest examples known in history were developed there, but, at least for some centuries, it has been a stranger to Kurdistan. It has been seen here, in the Rwandan area, it has taken a large part in the administration of life. Youths are recruited to the army, not to the following of a chieftain, and the military forces and the police have the task of regulating public order. Matters of civil and criminal law are decided in its courts, and the important matters of inheritance, marriage, and divorce require its authorization. Students may, if they are able, study in its schools and the sick can avail themselves of its medical facilities. Perhaps more importantly, it has insisted on the classification of land, holdings belonging

THE KURDS OF IRAQ

C. J. Edmonds

I.

KURDISTAN is the country inhabited by the Kurds as a homogeneous community. It is divided between Turkey, Persia and Iraq with small overlaps into Syria and the Soviet Union, and its boundaries do not coincide with any conventional frontiers or internal administrative divisions.

Iraqi Kurdistan is bounded on the north and east by the Turkish and Persian frontiers, where the population on both sides is almost entirely Kurdish. On the south-west the internal colonial boundary line approximately along the railway from the Syrian frontier to Mosul city on the Tigris and thence a straight line to Mandali on the Persian frontier. The majority of the Kurds are thus concentrated in the four *liwas* which in Ottoman times constituted the *vilayet* of Mosul: Mosul (31% of the rural population), Arbil (91%), Kirkuk (32%) and Sulaimani (100%). Kurds also have a majority in the two adjacent *qadhas* of Khanaqin and Mandali. Other than the Kurds, there are villages of Christian Christians near Mosul city to the north and east, and about 10,000 Assyrians completely settled in the highlands of the Amadiya region: there are also colonies of Turkomans in a string of towns, large and small, along the great highway leading from Mosul through Arbil, Altun Kupri, Kirkuk and Kifri towards Baghdad. On the other hand there are islands of Kurds outside these limits, the most interesting being the Jabal Sinjar, west of Mosul, where most of the inhabitants are Yazidis, the people often misleadingly described as devil-worshippers.

The Kurdish population of Iraq can be estimated with a fair degree of accuracy, on the basis of the census of 1947, at about 900,000 or nearly one fifth of the total for the whole country. No statistics are available for Persian Kurdistan but a similar figure would be a reasonable guess. The Turkish census of 1940 gives the number of persons whose mother tongue was Kurdish as one and a half million; there is reason to think that the real number of Kurds is higher, perhaps two millions. The religion of the great majority of the Kurds in all three countries is Sunni Muslim: the mystical dervish orders have adherents in all parts of Kurdistan.

Of the larger towns Sulaimani is entirely and Arbil predominantly Kurdish. Smaller townships in which Kurds form the whole or the large

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1. [Territorial-administrative units, with capitals sub-divided into districts which are subdivided into qadhas.—Analyst]

ing his form of rule to that of the feudal sovereign in Europe, Persia: «You are not the lord of a tribe, nor are your sons your tribesmen. You may clothe them, feed them, and make them rich, but they are not your cousins, they are but your servants» (Ibid, p. 84).

When Bakos rule was broken in 1851, Ottoman legal practice as well as personal ambition achieved a footing in the area. This contributed further to the breakdown of traditional principles, since it offered individuals the opportunity to manipulate the two different systems, traditional usage and Ottoman legal code, to their own advantage. The most profoundly affected land tenure. All land, unless otherwise registered, was deemed to belong to the Ottoman Sultan. Though the rule existed that no whole village should be registered as the property of any single person, this and other rules were generally overlooked. Thus leaders of clans, Begs, or in fact any other person who could bribe a few witnesses, registered large tracts of land as their personal property. Although armed power was of course necessary to make these formal transactions effective so far as the collecting of tax was concerned, the result was that a category of landowner emerged for which there was no clear traditional precedents, and their claims, when supported by power and supported Ottoman land code, could not truly be disputed. As a result, the field was left open to individual exploitation on a much larger scale than in Bakos times, and the only effective checks were the above mentioned threats to the personal safety of the exploiter.

COMPOSITE COMMUNITIES

In the Hamawand area, some local groups are found today where tribally organized Hamawand exploit a non-tribal peasant population (Mardjin) as a serf group. Such structures have come about by recent military conquest, and show incipient developments of a caste system. Certain aspects of organization have been developed by the Hamawand as an adjustment to this situation.

The Hamawand formal political structure already outlined was also a military hierarchy of command. Each village was expected to muster a group of horsemen, usually 10—11, led by the village Agha, as a fighting unit in the Hamawand army. Each of these soldiers,

• 636 In summary, the following diagram (No. 9) suggests the relative
637 positions of various social categories in the village hierarchy, and
638 their approximate spread on an ordinate of class-height — obviously
a very impressionistic diagram, for illustrative purposes only. Differ-
ent parts-systems that do not overlap in their spread on the low-high

Diagram No. 9. Relative status of some social categories.

axis are incompatible; furthermore, the mullah class are being fully integrated in the community, there will be a lower frequency of combination of the status of mullah with the other, theoretically compatible, part-systems.

PRECEDENCE IN LOYALTIES

637 In some conflict situations, any specific individual may be faced with a choice as to which group or person he should support — primarily the alternatives of lineage group vs. land, lineage group

B: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 Hill Kurd Hill Kurds

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• 548 The migrations and shiftings of the nomadic (Christian) population complicate even the various economic and permanent ties that have been given since the far have had important repercussions on the economics of the area. The nomadic groups were formerly widely distributed among the Kurdish villages, mainly in a region North East from area A. I Despite special grazing by Nigrim and others it would appear that, apart from the religious differentiation, there are formerly little ethnic or cultural difference between nomadic and Kurd. Other present conditions the differentiation is both more subtle. Pacification and the patronage of evangelistic European Christians has led the Nestor effect that those nomadics who are now left in the region are on the one hand engaged into highly lucrative relations, and on the other are rapidly showing a high degree of western sophistication with the accompanying technical advantages. One such nomadic colony exists at Nerim, and appears to be attaining considerable prosperity through the scientific development of tobacco cultivation. This seems to likely to have consequences for neighbouring Kurdish groups.

[n4] The distinguish area B therefore by the wildness of its climate, the comparative fertility and the isolation of the tribal organization as one ecology.

[m3] A. Plains area. Geographically this area differs completely from the other two. Largely flat, completely treeless, with a minimal rainfall, and crossed either by the four or five months of every year it would seem to be no place for the villager. But the soil is one of the richest in the world. In these part of the great "fertile crescent" an island of archaeological importance, and has yielded a rich annual crop of wheat and barley for literally thousands of years. [n12] Historically the area formed part of the great empires and Middle empires and the centre of archaeological remains is sufficient evidence of the economic and political importance in ancient times. Today the [n.1] population consists of two distinct cultural groups, nomadic and semi-[n2] nomadic Arabs intruders from the South and permanently settled Arabs with dominant Turkish and Armenian groups in the towns. According to [n4] map (p. 77) the penetration of the Arabs southwards into the Erbil plain is a comparatively recent historical event. So holds that the area was formerly occupied by nomadic Kurd groups who have been ousted by the recent expansion of the Jiaui tribe. The evidence for this [n5] does seem to be doubtful. In any case, whatever the historical facts, the techniques and economic arrangements of the plains Arabs are differ [n6] so markedly from the hill groups that in such respects they must be treated as a separate culture group. Politically also they differ from the hill Kurds in that the present village chiefs (Aghas) are mostly of quite different lineage to their followers, so that the organization tends to be feudal rather than tribal. I had supposed at first that this was a very recent development but similar conditions are described by Hay writing in 1909.

[See map, col. title, p. 71 -- illegible]

B: Leach E-S (1950) 1960 Will Hard Will
Rowanduz

Apart from these two territorial villages, all the groups in the Balik and Dargala areas are at least 100 years Rowanduz. The primitive element is provided by a few Jews and sometime Christians who are a main cause on some special trade such as weaving or carpentry and are then tolerated as useful members of the community.

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Method of Analysis

As in almost Iraq what has already been said, the tribal organisations of the various groups throughout the area under review have all to a greater or less degree been affected by outside ideas and interference by the external administrative authorities. If we go so far as to assume that at one time there was a form of social organisation which could be regarded as the typical norm for all the hill tribes of this region, it is certain that such a norm can nowhere now be found functioning in its complete state. Kurdish society as it exists today is a society undergoing extremely rapid and at times violent social change. As we shall see there are powerful and perhaps irresistible forces at work tending not at once to the annihilation as to the total destruction and disintegration of existing forms of tribal organisation. In such circumstances, in order to make the description intelligible at all, some degree of simplification seems essential. In the main therefore I shall seek to describe Kurdish society as if it were a functioning whole and then go on to describe circumstances or institutions from this idealised norm. I am aware that such a method makes the resulting description to some extent subjective and that at many points I have not the objective data to check the validity of my hypothetical norm. In the circumstances however it appears to be the most reasonable procedure to adopt.

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The External Administration

The previous form of the external administration has so very direct bearing on the Kurdish social system as described in this monograph. But at various points in the argument especially in the section dealing with economic problems reference will have to be made to elements in the administrative organisation, and it seems desirable therefore to give first a brief description of the functions and relationships of the various members of this external organisation.

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The administrative system of Iraq has been developed out of that of the old Ottoman Empire. The terminology remains in many respects unchanged. The whole of the Kurdish area have under

R: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 1951 Kurd 1951
Rowanduz

suppose that the same equivalent facts can sometimes subsist as
opposite representations of the ontological significance of kinship. The
following generations misunderstand the position of the ruler as understood
by him.

The first is reasonable enough:-

(p. 48) A tribe is a community or federation of communities which
exists for the protection of the members against external
aggression and for the maintenance of the old social customs
and standards of life. Some tribes have an exaggerated
sense of their importance.

The second is more hypothetical:-

(p. 49/50) The position of the chief varies greatly in different
tribes. In the remoter mountains, though granted the most
extravagant obeisance, he is distinctly one of the tribesmen,
the leading member of a family which has won its leadership
through military prowess. Lower down he often belongs to an
entirely separate caste, and comes from a different stock to
the tribesmen. The large tribes are divided into sections,
and in different tribes we find many sections with the same
name. This points to the fact that the sections represent
the original owners of the soil, while the present chiefs
belong to powerful families who have invaded their districts
and crushed their lands. This is probably the case with the
Bradi where nearly all the land belongs to one powerful
family, against which a few old tribal rights and headmen
still maintain an unequal struggle. Here the chief is a
landlord, and the system that prevails is feudal rather than
tribal.

The statement that in the foothills and plains were the Aghas
are frequently of different stock to their villagers is valid and has
already been commented upon in Chapter I. The idea that the tribes
"represent the original owners of the soil", while the permanent tribal
Aghas are conquering aristocrats is more fantasy, while as for the Bradi
the facts seem to be that the tribe itself is "all one family" (malik)
while the land is mostly held by free dwelling landlords who have no
kinship affiliations with the Bradi at all. While this lineage
distinction between Agha and tenant is valid for the plains area, it
does not apply to the tribal districts. The following for instance is
quite simple:-

(Dep. p. 47) In the bigger tribes the Aghas, whose families have
for many generations been entirely disassociated from manual
labour, are of a far finer type than the peasants.